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Abstract
This Note examines the arbitrability of antitrust claims raised by a United States party against
a foreign party and attempts to reconcile a domestic public policy against the arbitrability of an-
titrust claims with the mandate of the Convention. It focuses on the case law relating to this policy,
as well as the Convention, and applies it to Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc.
APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS:
MITSUBISHI MOTORS CORP. v.
SOLER CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH, INC.
INTRODUCTION
The Anglo-Saxon judicial tradition has been one of antip-
athy to arbitration.' However, the recent trend in the United
States is to uphold the validity of arbitration clauses and to en-
force resulting awards.2 Within the context of international
commercial transactions, this tendency is the result of the ex-
1. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983-84
(2d Cir. 1942). This notion is based on the judicially provincial ground that such
private settlement mechanisms tend to "oust" the jurisdiction of the courts. Kill v.
Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (1746).
2. The United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, § 1, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current
version at 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)), enacted in 1925, marked the beginning of Congres-
sional adherence to a national policy favoring arbitration. In Scherk v. Alberto-Cul-
ver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), the Supreme Court, in upholding the arbitrability of a
dispute which concerned a violation of the federal securities laws, cited the enact-
ment of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), as reversing "centu-
ries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements." Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510. Justice
Stewart stated:
A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes
shall be litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispen-
sable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability es-
sential to any international business transaction. Furthermore, such a provi-
sion obviates the danger that a dispute under the agreement might be sub-
mitted to a forum hostile to the interests of one of the parties or unfamiliar
with the problem area involved.
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an international
arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these purposes, but would
invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure
tactical litigation advantages.
Id. at 516-17 (footnote omitted). The traditional hostility of courts to contractual
instruments which deprive them of the authority to decide disputes was recounted
and rejected in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1971). The Court
stated that " [tihe argument that such clauses are improper because they tend to
'oust' a court of jurisdiction is hardly more than a vestigal legal fiction." Id. at 12.
This fiction stems from "historical judicial resistance to any attempt to reduce the
power and business of a particular court and has little place in an era when all courts
are overloaded and when businesses once essentially local now operate in world mar-
kets." Id.; see Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852, 858 (1984); Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967). For a discussion of international com-
mercial arbitration, see generally Carbonneau, Arbitral Adjudication: A Comparative As-
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pansion of international trade and the concomitant judicial
recognition of the business world's increasing reluctance to lit-
igate differences in foreign courts of law.'
The United States acceded to the Convention on the Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards4 (Con-
vention) on September 30, 1970. 5 The Convention is intended
sessment of its Remedial and Substantive Status in Transnational Commerce, 19 TEX. INT'L L.J.
33 (1984).
3. See Ishizumi, International Commercial Arbitration and Federal Securities Regulation:
Reconciling Two Conflicting Policies, 6J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L. 81, 81 (1984); Perl-
man & Nelson, New Approaches to the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes, 17
INT'L LAW. 215, 218-27 (1983); see also Carbonneau, Law Making Through Arbitration:
The Rendering of Awards with Reasons and the Elaboration of a Common Law of International
Transactions, 23 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 579, 579 (1985) ("[w]ith the growth of inter-
national trade, arbitration has emerged as the preferred remedy for resolving inter-
national commercial disputes."); Note, The Validity of Foreign Sovereign Immunity Defense
in Suits Under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 7
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 321, 321 (1984) ("[commercial arbitration has become an indis-
pensable method of dispute resolution in the international business community...
[while avoiding] the complex, time-consuming and expensive process of litigation.").
4. Opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 38 (1958) (effective Dec. 29, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Convention]. The
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards is also
referred to as the New York Convention of 1958. As of January 1, 1983, 61 states
have acceded to the Convention. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 201-02
(1983).
5. The United States participated in the 1958 negotiations of the Convention
but did not become a signatory at that time. See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, CON-
VENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS, S.
EXEC. Doc. No. E. 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968) [hereinafter cited as S. EXEC. Doc.
No. E.]; Excerpts from Report of United States Delegation to United Nations Conference on
International Commercial Arbitration, Report of the Committee on International Unification of
Private Law, in PROCEEDINGS ABA SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
253 (1960) [hereinafter cited as ABA Report]; Ishizumi, supra note 3, at 86-87. See
generally Czyzak & Sullivan, American Arbitration Law and the U.N. Convention, 13 ARB.J.
197 (1958) (discussing the reasons why the United States did not become a signatory
of the Convention when it was originally opened for signature). The delegation rec-
ommended against signing the Convention because the agreement was not compati-
ble with United States law. See H.R. REP. No. 1181, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1181]; S. EXEC. REP. No. 10, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
6-8 (1968) [hereinafter cited as S. EXEC. REP. No. 10]; ABA Report, supra, at 210.
However, much support for the Convention from private groups prompted President
Lyndon Johnson, in 1968, to submit the Convention to the Senate for advice and
consent. See S. EXEC. Doc. No. E., supra, at 3; S. EXEC. REP. No. 10, supra, at 6-7.
Senate advice and ratification was concluded on October 4, 1968. 114 CONG. REC.
29,605 (1968); see S. REP. No. 702, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970). The Administra-
tion introduced the appropriate bills to implement the legislation which were passed
and approved on July 31, 1970. Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat.
692 (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1982)). The United States filed its instrument of
accession on September 30, 1970, and chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration Act,
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to provide a uniform means to ensure that the advantages of
arbitration are achieved in the international sphere.6 The goal
9 U.S.C. § 201 (1982), which expressly implements the Convention, entered into
force on December 29, 1970. Id. § 210.
Section 201 provides for the enforcement of the Convention in the United States
courts "in accordance with this chapter." Id. Section 202 proscribes the types of
agreements and awards that fall under the Convention and is intended to make it
clear that an agreement or award arising out of a legal relationship exclusively be-
tween citizens of the United States is not enforceable under the Convention in
United States courts unless it has a reasonable relation with a foreign state. Id. § 202;
see also Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 929 (2d Cir. 1983); Note,
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards-The United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 14 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 217, 230 (1984)
(discussing the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the United States). See gen-
erally Bergeson v. Joseph Muller Corp., 548 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 710
F.2d 928, 929 (2d Cir. 1983) (the Convention does allow enforcement in the United
States courts of an award rendered in the United States). Section 203 gives the
United States district courts jurisdiction over proceedings falling under the Conven-
tion regardless of the amount in controversy. 9 U.S.C. § 203. Section 204 estab-
lishes venue with respect to such action or proceeding. Id. § 204. Section 205 per-
mits removal of cases from state to federal courts. Id. § 205. Section 206 permits a
court to compel arbitration at the place provided' for in the arbitration agreement.
Id. § 206. This section is, however, permissive rather than mandatory, since there
may be circumstances in which it would be desirable to direct arbitration within the
district in which the action is brought but inappropriate to direct arbitration abroad.
See H.R. REP. No. 1181,supra, at 3604. Section 207 deals with confirmation of awards
made under the Convention. 9 U.S.C. § 207. A similar provision is included in § 9
of the United States Arbitration Act. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, § 9, 43
Stat. 883 (1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982)). Section 208 makes the
provisions of the Arbitration Act applicable to actions brought under the Convention
to the extent that such provisions are not in conflict with the implementing legisla-
tion or the Convention as ratified by the United States. 9 U.S.C. § 208; see H.R. REP.
No. 1181, supra, at 3604. For a discussion of the provisions of the Convention and
the federal implementing legislation, as well as potential discrepancies between the
Convention and the implementing legislation, see Aksen, American Arbitration Accession
Arrives in the Age of Aquarius: United States Implements United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 Sw. L. REV. 1 (1971); McMahon,
Implementation of the United Nations Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United
States, 2 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 735 (1971); Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE
LJ. 1049 (1961).
6. Newman & Burrows, International Litigation: Judicial Intervention in Arbitrability of
Int'l Claims, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 26, 1984, at 1, col. 1 ("[tlhe Convention . . . was enacted
to foster arbitration of disputes by international contracting parties."). "Arbitration
is a faster, less costly and more private, informal and confidential means to settle
commercial disputes than litigation." Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, 71
A.B.A. J. 78, 79 (1985). For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of
international commercial arbitration as compared to litigation, see Aksen, Arbitration
and Antitrust-Are They Compatible?, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1097, 1099-1104; Ehrenhaft,
Effective International Commercial Arbitration, 9 LAw. & PoL'v INT'L Bus. 1191 (1977);
Kawakami & Henderson, Arbitration in U.S./Japanese Sales Disputes, 42 WASH. L. REV.
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of the Convention, and the principal purpose -underlying its
implementation by the United States, is to encourage the rec-
ognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agree-
ments in international contracts, 7 to unify the standards for ob-
serving agreements to arbitrate,8 and to enforce arbitral
awards in the signatory states. 9
Despite the advantages offered by commercial arbitration,
it is not always a satisfactory dispute resolution mechanism. 0
Although the parties to an international commercial contract
may include clauses providing for choice-of-law" and choice-
of-forum,' 2 and for arbitration as the exclusive remedy of dis-
putes arising from the contract,' 3 there is no guarantee that a
541 (1967); Loevinger, Antitrust Issues as Subjects of Arbitration, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1085,
1089-91 (1969); Perlman & Nelson, supra note 3, at 218-27.
7. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
8. Id.; see Ishizumi, supra note 3, at 84-85; Quigley, supra note 5, at 1060.
9. Scherh, 417 U.S. at 520 n.15.
10. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 6, at 1193-95; Loevinger, supra note 6, at 1090-91.
Compare Aksen, supra note 6, at 1099-1104 with Loevinger, supra note 6, at 1089-91
(comparison of arguments regarding the arbitrability of antitrust claims).
11. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516. A choice-of-law clause is intended to provide
certainty so as to protect the expectations of parties, regardless of where suit is
brought. 1 V. NANDA, THE LAw OF TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 8.03[l]
(1982).
12. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516; Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15. A choice-of-forum clause
is designed to eliminate the uncertainties regarding the place of suit by selection of
the forum in advance. 1 V. NANDA, supra note 11, § 8.021I](a). The Supreme Court
has held that "such clauses are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless en-
forcement is shown . . . to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances." Bremen, 407
U.S. at 10 (footnote omitted).
13. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 508; see also Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v.
Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir.
1974) (holding that enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on the
basis of the public policy defense of the Convention only where enforcement would
violate the forum state's most basic notions of morality and justice); Helfenbein v.
International Industries, Inc., 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872
(1971) (sublessee's claim against lessor to recover treble damages for violation of
Sherman and Clayton Acts was held nonarbitrable even though the lease provided
for arbitration of all claims and controversies); American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P.
MaGuire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) (providing that a clause for arbitration
of all controversies, disputes, and claims was unenforceable); A. & E. Plastik Pak Co.
v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding that it was an abuse of the
lower court's discretion to make an antitrust claim available for arbitration even
though the parties' contract called for arbitration of all claims and controversies);
Ehrenhaft, supra note 6, at 1216-17 (discussing the practices of other nations in deter-
mining whether or not to uphold an arbitration clause). But cf. Ledee v. Ceramiche
Ragno, 684 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1982) (an agreement to arbitrate must be enforced
unless the agreement is found null and void, inoperative or incapable of being per-
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court will not treat a given dispute as nonarbitrable, particu-
larly when the issue is highly charged with competing public
policy concerns.' 4 The subject of the United States public pol-
icy exception to the arbitrability of international commercial
disputes has received widespread attention.' 5
This Note examines the arbitrability of antitrust claims
raised by a United States party against a foreign party and at-
tempts to reconcile a domestic public policy against the arbi-
trability of antitrust claims with the mandate of the Conven-
tion.16 It focuses on the case law relating to this policy, as well
as the Convention, and applies it to Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,' 7 a case presently before the United
States Supreme Court. Part I provides an overview of the
United States case law concerning the arbitration of securities
and antitrust disputes, both domestic and international. Part
II examines Mitsubishi and compares and contrasts the inter-
pretation of the case law and Convention by the district court
and court of appeals. Finally, Part III analyzes the case law and
the Convention and offers a framework for deciding the arbi-
trability of international antitrust claims. This Note concludes
that antitrust claims raised by a party to an international con-
tract are arbitrable as mandated by the Convention.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE ISSUE
The arbitrability of claims involving the United States se-
formed); McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT, 501 F.2d 1032 (3rd Cir. 1974)
(holding that the district court was bound by the terms of the Convention and by the
request of one of the parties to the agreement to refer the parties to arbitration).
14. See J. LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
541-65 (1978); A. VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958
359-82 (1981); Aksen, supra note 6, at 1104; Barry, Application of the Public Policy Excep-
tion to the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Under the New York Convention: A Modest
Proposal, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 832 (1978); Ehrenhaft, supra note 6, at 1200-19; Loevinger,
supra note 6, at 1088, 1090-91; McMahon, supra note 5, at 757-58; Comment, The
Public Policy Defense to Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 7 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 228 (1977).
15. See A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 14, at 359-82; Aksen, supra note 6, at 1104;
Barry, supra note 14, at 838-50; Ishizumi, supra note 3, at 92-99; Loevinger, supra note
6, at 1088; Perlman & Nelson, supra note 3, at 228; Comment, supra note 14, at 239-
50; see also J. LEW, supra note 14, at 531-91 (discussing international public policy).
16. See infra notes 133-207 and accompanying text.
17. 723 F.2d 155 (1983), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 291 (1984).
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curities laws or antitrust laws is a subject of dispute.' 8 The res-
olution of these issues hinges on whether such cases involve
solely domestic parties or include international parties.' 9 On a
domestic level, federal courts decline to permit the arbitration
of securities disputes in the interest of protecting investors'
rights under the United States securities laws. 20 A similar ra-
tionale applies to the sanctions against arbitration of domestic
antitrust disputes. The Supreme Court has recognized that
private antitrust actions provide an important public enforce-
ment purpose in that "[a]ntitrust laws in general, and the Sher-
man Act in particular, . . . are as important to the preservation
of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill
of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal
freedoms."'"
Conversely, in an international context, United States
courts have sanctioned the arbitration of securities claims, 22
reasoning that private dispute settlement of securities claims
presents less danger to the public good than does nonjudicial
resolution of antitrust issues.23 Further, these courts have
found that international parties' diminished expectations ofju-
dicial settlement bolster such holdings.24
A. Arbitrability of Securities Claims
1. Claims Raised in a Domestic Context: Wilko v. Swan
It is well established that claims arising under the Securi-
ties Act of 193325 (Securities Act) are nonarbitrable in a do-
mestic context by virtue of Wilko v. Swan.2 6 In that case, the
United States Supreme Court held that an agreement provid-
18. See generally Ishizumi, supra note 3, at 87-97 ("[t]he reach of U.S. securities
laws is a subject of dispute, within the U.S. judicial system, as well as in the interna-
tional community." Id. at 87).
19. Compare American Safety Equip. Corp. v.J.P. MaGuire & Co., 391 F.2d 821
(2d Cir. 1968) and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723
F.2d 155 (1983), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 291 (1984) with Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427
(1953) and Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 25-38.
21. United States v. Topco, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); see infra note 49.
22. See Scherk, 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
23. See infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
24. See supra note 3.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1976).
26. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). Wilko concerned an action raised by a customer against
the partners in a securities brokerage firm to recover damages under § 12(2) of the
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ing for the arbitration of securities disputes arising between
two domestic parties was void under section 14 of the Securi-
ties Act, notwithstanding the provisions of the United States
Arbitration Act.27 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide whether an agreement to arbitrate a future controversy
was void under section 14 of the Securities Act as a stipulation
binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance
with the statutory requirement that the aggrieved party be per-
mitted to select the judicial forum of his choice. 28 An agree-
ment to arbitrate securities issues is considered to be a waiver
of an investor's right to trial.29
Wilko sought to harmonize Congressional support for ar-
bitration as evidenced by the Federal Arbitration Act, 30 with
the Securities Act,31 which Congress enacted to protect the
rights of investors.32 The Court ruled in favor of invalidating
agreements for arbitration of issues arising under the Securi-
ties Act,33 which in effect favored the Securities Act over the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77a, for an alleged misrepresentation in the sale of securi-
ties. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428-38.
27. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-38. The basis of the Court's decision was threefold:
1) An agreement to arbitrate future controversies was void under § 14 of the Securi-
ties Act as a stipulation to waive compliance with the provisions of the Act; 2) The
right of an aggrieved party under § 22(a) to select the judicial forum is a provision of
the Securities Act that cannot be waived under § 14; and 3) As the protective provi-
sion of the Securities Act require the exercise of judicial discretion to fairly assure
their effectiveness, Congress must have intended § 14 to apply to waiver of judicial
trial and review. Id. at 432-37.
28. Id. at 434-35. The statutory requirements in issue are laid out in § 14 of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77n. This section provides that "[a]ny condition, stipula-
tion, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with
any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission
shall be void." Id.
29. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435; see Ishizumi, supra note 3, at 90-94.
30. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, § 1, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current ver-
sion at 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)). The Supreme Court recently held that the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), "requires that the courts compel arbitration of
arbitrable claims, when asked to do so . . . [and] requires courts to enforce the bar-
gain of the parties to arbitrate .... ." Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, No. 83-
1708, slip op. at 4 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 1985).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1976).
32. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430-31; see Fedders, Wade, Mann & Beizer, Waiver By Con-
duct-A Possible Response to the Internationalization of the Securities Markets, 6J. CoMP. Bus.
& CAP. MKT. L. 1, 5-6 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Fedders].
33. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435, 438.
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Federal Arbitration Act.34
It is important to understand two things about Wilko.
First, the holding in Wilko was applied within a domestic con-
text.35 Second, the Court was concerned with protecting the
rights of an individual investor 36 who is likely not to be familiar
with his rights either before or after a dispute arises.3 7 How-
ever, this reasoning would not hold true where an interna-
tional claim is raised by a large corporation against another
corporation because both are likely to be familiar with their
rights .38
2. Claims Raised in an International Context:
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.
In the area of international securities claims, an exception
to Wilko has been made and these disputes are arbitrable.39 In
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,40 the Supreme Court found that an
arbitration clause in a contract between a United States com-
pany and a German citizen for the sale of European trademarks
was enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act.4 1
In declining to extend the holding in Wilko v. Swan, the
Supreme Court held that because the underlying agreement
was truly international in character 42 and contained a clause
providing for arbitration, 43 judicial intervention was pre-
cluded.44 The Court based its decision on three reasons:
1) The provision for arbitration in the agreement contained a
choice-of-law clause that solved the problem of which nation's
34. Id. at 435 (holding that the right to select a judicial forum is a " 'provision'
that cannot be waived under § 14 of the Securities Act.").
35. Id. at 428-29.
36. Id. at 435. A primary concern when deciding whether certain claims are ar-
bitrable is the possibility of contracts of adhesion. For a recent discussion, see
Ishizumi, supra note 3 at 93.
37. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435.
38. See Ishizumi, supra note 3, at 103 ("[o]verweening bargaining power is most
likely where the American party is an unsophisticated individual and the foreign party
is a large corporation . . .").
39. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 513 (1974) (holding that inter-
national securities claims are arbitrable); see infra text accompanying notes 40-47.
40. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
41. Id. at 519-20.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 508.
44. Id. at 514-20.
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substantive law should apply to the dispute;45 2) A refusal by
one country to grant arbitration would "invite unseemly and
mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical
litigation advantages"; 46 and 3) The advantages of choosing
from a wider choice of courts and venue which is offered to a
plaintiff in a domestic securities dispute, could well be illusory
because a foreign party could obtain a foreign court order nul-
lifying the advantage.4 7
B. Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims
1. Claims Raised in a Domestic Context:
American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co.
In American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co.,48
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that a claim of a domestic licensee alleging violations of the
Sherman Antitrust Act 49 by a United States company, was inap-
45. Id. at 516. The contract contained an arbitration clause providing for arbi-
tration of any claim arising out of the contract before the International Chamber of
Commerce in Paris, France, and that "[t]he laws of the State of Illinois, U.S.A. shall
apply to and govern this agreement, its interpretation and performance." Id. at 508.
In Bremen, 407 U.S. 1 (1971), the Court ruled that "in the light of present day com-
mercial realities and expanding international trade. . . the forum clause should con-
trol absent a strong showing that it should be set aside." Id. at 15; see Scherk, 417 U.S.
at 516. But cf. Wilko, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), where there was no question that the
United States law generally, and the federal securities law specifically, would govern
disputes arising out of the stock-purchase agreement. Id. at 438. The parties, the
negotiations, and the subject matter of the contract were all situated in the United
States, id. at 428-29, thereby removing any doubt that a conflict-of-law claim would
ever arise.
46. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516-17. The parties may attempt forum shopping in that
each will seek to resort to the court which offers him the most favorable litigation
advantages. For example, in Scherk, it is conceivable that if Scherk had anticipated
that Alberto-Culver would be able to enjoin resort to arbitration in the United States
he might have sought an order in France or some other country enjoining Alberto-
Culver from proceeding with its litigation in the United States. Id. at 517; see Perlman
& Nelson, supra note 3, at 219-20.
47. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 517-18. A securities buyer has a wider choice of courts
and venue in a domestic securities contract and thus gives up more than would a
participant in an international business transactions when surrendering his right to
sue in courts by agreeing to arbitrate all claims arising out of the contract. Id. How-
ever, in the context of an international contract, "an opposing party may by speedy
resort to a foreign court block or hinder access to the American court of the pur-
chaser's choice." Id. at 518.
48. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The antitrust laws, including of the Sherman Act, have
rested "on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will
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propraite for arbitration. 50 The court concluded that a claim
under the antitrust laws is not merely a private matter, based in
part on the notion that a "plaintiff asserting his rights under
the [Sherman] Act has been likened to a private attorney-gen-
eral who protects the public's interest."'"
The court cites four reasons as the basis for the exception
of domestic antitrust claims from arbitration. First, the imple-
mentation of antitrust laws, so vital to the successful function-
ing of a free economy, is delegated by statute to both govern-
mental and private parties.52 Second, the strong possibility
tha: contracts generating antitrust disputes may be contracts of
adhesion militates against automatic forum determination by
contract.5" Third, antitrust issues are complicated, and the evi-
dence extensive and complex.54 Finally, the court did not
think it proper to allow businessmen to make decisions which
regulate the business community in which they operate.5 5
As the court did not consider agreements to arbitrate
made after a dispute arises,56 the American Safety doctrine is
properly limited to predispute agreements to arbitrate. In ef-
fect, however, the American Safety doctrine represents a "rarity
in our jurisprudence ' 5 7 because of the otherwise strong policy
in favor of arbitration, as evidenced by the Federal Arbitration
Act. 51 While the circuit courts that have had occasion to con-
sider the American Safety doctrine have embraced it, each of
these courts' cases have been decided in a strictly domestic
context. 9 There is no suggestion that American Safety pre-
yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an envi-
ronment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institu-
tion." Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); see supra note 21
and accompanying text.
50. American Safety, 391 F.2d at 828.
51. Id. at 826; see Waldron v. Cities Service Co., 361 F.2d 671, 673 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. granted, 385 U.S. 1024 (1967).
52. American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826.
53. Id. at 827.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 162.
58. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, § 1, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current ver-
sion at 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).
59. See, e.g., Applied Digital Technology Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576
F.2d 116, 117 (7th Cir. 1978); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 43 (5th Cir. 1974); Helf-
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cludes the arbitration of international antitrust disputes.
2. Claims Raised in an International Context:
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
On October 15, 1984, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.6" in
order to decide the issue of whether antitrust claims asserted
under the Sherman Antitrust Act are arbitrable pursuant to the
Convention, and the Federal Arbitration Act. 6 Thus, the
Court must choose between extending Scherk,6 2 thereby pro-
viding for the arbitration of antitrust claims in an international
context,63 or extending American Safety,6 4 thereby making anti-
trust claims nonarbitrable in an international context.
65
II. MITSUBISHI MOTORS CORP. v. SOLER CHRYSLER-
PLYMOUTH, INC.
A. Facts of the Case
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. (SCP), a Puerto Rican com-
pany with its principal place of business in San Juan,6 6 entered
into a Distributor Agreement in 1979 with Chrysler Interna-
tional, S.A. (CISA), a wholly owned subsidiary of the United
States Chrysler Corp.6 7 SCP was to act as a dealer of cars and
trucks manufactured in Japan for Chrysler Corp. by Mitsubishi
enbein v. International Industries, Inc., 438 F.2d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1971); Power
Replacements Inc. v. Air Preheater Co., 426 F.2d 980, 983-84 (9th Cir. 1970); A.& E.
Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 716 (9th Cir. 1968).
In Silvercup Bakers, Inc. v. Fink Baking Corp., 273 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), the question of the arbitrability of antitrust issues was first raised. The court
held that absent an explicit statement to the contrary the parties to a collective bar-
gaining agreement did not intend to forego their rights to press tort damage claims
and accordingly, the antitrust claim was not subject to arbitration under the contract.
Id. at 163-64. American Safety, 391 F.2d 821 (1968), extended the reasoning of Silver-
cup Bakers and held that antitrust claims are not a private matter and are therefore
nonarbitrable. Id. at 827-28. The court stated that the "Sherman Act is designed to
promote the national interest in a competitive economy... ." Id. at 826.
60. 723 F.2d 155 (1983), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 291 (1984).
61. Brief for Appellant at i, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 723 F.2d 155 (1st Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Brief].
62. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
64. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 48-59.
66. Brief, supra note 61, at 4.
67. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 157.
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Motors Corp. (MMC), a Japanese company with its principal
place of business in Tokyo.68 The vehicles provided by MMC
were manufactured to SCP's order and were designed espe-
cially for Puerto Rico.69 SCP simultaneously entered into a
Sales Procedure Agreement 70 (Agreement) with CISA to which
MMC was also a party. 7' Article VI of the Agreement provided
for arbitration of certain future disputes that might arise be-
tween MMC and SCP. Arbitration was to be in accordance
with the rules of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Associa-
tion,72 and the laws of Switzerland were to be applied to the
contract.73
SCP's business initially prospered, but throughout 1980
68. Brief, supra note 61, at 2.
69. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit at 3, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
723 F.2d 155 (lst Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Petition].
70. The Sales Procedure Agreement (Agreement) established procedures for
the sale and delivery of MMC-built vehicles to SCP. Petition, supra note 69, at 3. The
Agreement specifically provided that it did not create a franchisor-franchisee rela-
tionship between MMC and SCP. Brief, supra note 61, at 4.
71. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 157.
72. Id. The Agreement provided that disputes arising out of articles I-B through
V or for the breach thereof "shall be finally settled by arbitration in Japan in accord-
ance with the rules and regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Associa-
tion." Id. (quoting article VI of the Agreement). Under the rules of the Japan Com-
mercial Arbitration Association, the arbitral tribunal is required to include in its
award a statement of the reason for the award unless the parties have agreed that no
such statement is necessary. JAPAN COM. ARB. R. 36(4); see Kitagawa & Fukushima,
Japan: The Japan Commercial Arbitration Association, in HANDBOOK OF INSTITUTIONAL AR-
BITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 115, 127-28 (1977). In the United States, an
arbitral tribunal's award may be rendered without explanation of the reasons and
without a complete record of their proceedings. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436. An award
may be vacated pursuant to § 10 of the United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, § 1,43
Stat. 883 (1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C.. § 1 (1982)), but the reasons for vacating
must be clear. Therefore, under the Japan Commercial Arbitration Rules there
would always be a clear record of the arbitrators' decision in the event that a party
sought to have the award vacated. Under the United States Arbitration Act, however,
there would not necessarily be a record and therefore, no grounds to vacate. Id.
73. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., No. 82-538, at 2
(D.P.R. Nov. 24, 1982) (order compelling arbitration). Article 22 of the Distributor-
ship Agreement provided that "[tihis Agreement is made in, and will be governed by
and construed in all respects according to the laws of the Swiss Confederation as if
entirely performed therein .... ." Id. (quoting article 22 of the Agreement). The
court of appeals noted that although the Agreement states that it is to be governed by
Swiss law, the scope of the arbitration agreement is an issue of federal law. Mitsubishi,
723 F.2d at 159 n.3; see Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG Industries, Inc., 514 F.2d 614,
616 (1st Cir. 1975).
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and 1981 the automobile market in Puerto Rico declined.
7 4
SCP became unable to meet minimum sales commitments in
its territory, and MMC and CISA forbid SCP to reexport vehi-
cles to Central and South America and the continental United
States.75 SCP became insolvent and unable to arrange any
form of financing for vehicles it had ordered.76 MMC withheld
shipment of additional new vehicles to SCP, eventually storing
966 vehicles in Japan 77 for which SCP owed MMC in excess of
U.S.$300 million.78 In February 1982, following unsuccessful
negotiations between MMC and SCP, 79 SCP disclaimed re-
sponsibility for the 966 vehicles stored in Japan.8 ° SCP stated
that it would not honor its obligations to MMC. It broke off
further negotiations and any further relationship with MMC,
and threatened to commence litigation to enjoin MMC from
seeking alternative distribution arrangements in Puerto Rico.8 '
On March 15, 1982, MMC commenced an action in the
United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico
against SCP, alleging nonpayment for the stored vehicles, non-
payment of contractual storage penalties, damage to Mitsu-
bishi's warranties and goodwill, expiration of SCP's distribu-
torship, and other breaches of the Agreement.82 MMC peti-
tioned for an Order compelling arbitration in Japan under the
Federal Arbitration Act and the Convention. 3
On May 7, 1982, SCP answered and counterclaimed
against both MMC and CISA.8 4 It sought actual and punitive
damages exceeding U.S.$360 million for alleged antitrust and
unfair trade violations, 85 as well as claims for common law
74. Petition, supra note 69, at 3.
75. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 157.
76. Petition, supra note 69, at 3.
77. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 157.
78. Petition, supra note 69, at 3.
79. Id.
80. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 157.
81. Petition, supra note 69, at 3-4.
82. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 157.
83. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., No. 82-538
(D.P.R. Nov. 24, 1982) (order compelling arbitration).
84. Petition, supra note 69, at 4.
85. Brief, supra note 61, at 8. SCP counterclaimed that MMC allegedly violated
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), the Puerto Rican antitrust and unfair compe-
tition statute, P.R. LAws ANN. tit. X, § 257 (1976), the Federal Arbitration Automo-
bile Dealer's Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1221 (1976), and the Puerto Rico Dealer's
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fraud, breach of contract, libel, and interference with contrac-
tual relations. s6 Further, SCP contended that as a matter of
public policy antitrust issues could not be resolved by arbitra-
tion.87 SCP claimed that MMC's contract claims were "inextri-
cably interwoven with the antitrust claims advanced by SCP. ' 88
It therefore asked the district court to resolve both the anti-
trust and the contract claims, or stay the arbitration of any ar-
bitrable claims pending adjudication of any counterclaims that
it might deem nonarbitrable s9 Finally, on May 27, 1982,
MMC filed a Supplemental Motion9" to compel arbitration of
SCP's counterclaims and for a stay, pending arbitration, of any
nonarbitrable counterclaims. 91
B. The Ruling of the District Court
The United States District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico entered its Opinion and Order on November 24, 1982,2
holding that SCP's Sherman Act counterclaim explicitly fell
within the parties' agreement and was therefore arbitrable.93
Act, P.R. LAws ANN. tit. X, § 258 (1976). Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 157. SCP alleged
that MMC and CISA unlawfully divided markets, and in furtherance of this action,
refused to allow transshipment of vehicles throughout the Americas. Id. at 160. SCP
also alleged that MMC engaged in a boycott and other predatory practices intended
to drive SCP out of business. Id.
86. Brief, supra note 61, at 8.
87. Petition, supra note 69, at 5; see American Safety Equip. Corp. v.J.P. Maguire
& Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). For cases holding antitrust issues as nonarbitra-
ble, see supra note 59.
88. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155 (1st Cir. 1983).
89. Id. SCP averred that arbitration should be stayed pursuant to the Dealer's
Act of Puerto Rico (Law No. 75), P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. X, § 278b-2 (Supp. 1980), which
provides that dealers' contracts shall be interpreted pursuant to the laws of the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico and that any stipulation to the contrary shall be void. Mit-
subishi, 723 F.2d at 158. It also provides that any stipulation that obligates a dealer to
adjust, arbitrate or litigate any controversy that arises regarding a dealer's contract
outside of Puerto Rico, or under foreign law, is likewise considered as violating the
public policy of the Act and is therefore null and void. Id.
90. This supplemental motion was filed pursuant to 9 U.S.C. §§ 4, 201 (1982).
Brief, supra note 61, at 8.
91. Brief, supra note 61, at 8.
92. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., No. 82-538
(D.P.R. Nov. 24, 1982) (order compelling arbitration).
93. Id. at 10-11; see Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 158. The district court also held that
all of MMC's claims and all but two, and part of a third, of SCP's counterclaims were
within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement. Id. The excluded counter-
claims were for an alleged libel set forth in MMC's moving papers in this action,
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In rejecting SCP's claim that, as a matter of law and policy,
antitrust issues could not be referred to arbitration, the district
court concluded that the Federal Arbitration Act clearly ap-
plied to the dispute.94 The court reasoned that the contractual
relationship between MMC and SCP was truly international9'
and that arbitration of the parties' commercial disputes,
whether arising under the antitrust laws or otherwise, was
therefore mandated by chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration
Act.
9 6
The court also referred to the strong judicial policy favor-
ing the submission of contractual disputes to arbitration as
mandated by the Convention.97 It focused on article 11(3) of
the Convention to determine whether the parties' agreement
was "null and void, inoperative or incapable of being per-
formed,"98 and therefore incapable of being arbitrated.99 The
another alleged libel, and a claim that MMC had coerced SCP into agreeing to an
improper minimum sales volume. Petition, supra note 69, at 5.
94. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. No. 82-538, at 8
(D.P.R. Nov. 24, 1982) (order compelling arbitration). The United States Arbitration
Act, ch. 213, § 1, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)), applies
to a "written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction . . . " Id. § 2. When a contract involves "commerce" as defined in 9
U.S.C. § 1, "whether a 'suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration ...under an
agreement [to arbitrate]' pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3, or to
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
art. II 3 and 9 U.S.C. § 206, is clearly a matter of federal substantive law." Becker
Autoradio v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1978). The Act
supplants only that state law inconsistent with its express provisions. Societe Gener-
ale v. Raytheon, 643 F.2d at 863, 867 (1st Cir. 1981).
95. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. No. 82-538, at 7
(D.P.R. Nov. 24, 1982) (order compelling arbitration).
96. Id. at 9-11.
97. Id. at 5. Chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 201
(1982), was passed by Congress in order to implement the Convention. See supra
note 5. Section 201 of this chapter provides unequivocally that the Convention
"shall be enforced in the United States courts in accordance with this chapter." 9
U.S.C. § 201.
98. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., No. 82-538 at 6-7
(D.P.R. Nov. 24, 1982) (order compelling arbitration). Article II of the Convention
provides:
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differ-
ences which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a
defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject
matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
2. The term "agreement in writing" shall include an arbitral clause in
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court concluded that the agreement of the parties to arbitrate
certain disputes arising out of their international commercial
transaction should be protected and enforced by the federal
courts in accordance with the express provisions of the Federal
Arbitration Act.100
C. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, SCP argued that MMC had waived its rights to
arbitrate; that the arbitration agreement was not broad enough
to encompass its Sherman Act claims; and that arbitration of
Sherman Act claims may not be compelled as a matter of law,
even in international cases. 01 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district
court regarding SCP's antitrust counterclaims, and affirmed
the judgment as to all other issues.1 0 2 The court held that liti-
gation, not arbitration, was the only appropriate means for the
a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in
an exchange of letters or telegrams.
3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a mat-
ter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the mean-
ing of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties
to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inopera-
tive or incapable of being performed.
Convention, supra note 4, art. II (emphasis added).
99. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., No. 82-538, at 6-7
(D.P.R. Nov. 24, 1982) (order compelling arbitration). The court followed the rea-
soning of Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1982), which stated that:
The parochial interests of the Commonwealth, or of any state, cannot be the
measure of how the "null and void" clause is interpreted. Indeed, by acced-
ing to and implementing the treaty, the federal government has insisted that
not even the parochial interests of the nation may be the measure of inter-
pretation. Rather, the clause must be interpreted to encompass only those
situations-such as fraud, mistake, duress, and waiver-that can be applied
neutrally on an international scale.
Id. at 187 (footnote omitted); see I.T.A.D. Associates, Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75
(4th Cir. 1981); Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale de
L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1974) (construing
narrowly the "public policy" defense against enforcement of awards under article
V(2)(b)); McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT, 501 F.2d 1032, 1037 (3d Cir. 1974)
(observing that there is "nothing discretionary" about article 11(3) of the Con-
vention).
100. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., No. 82-538, at 8
(D.P.R. Nov. 24, 1982) (order compelling arbitration).
101. Petition, supra note 69, at 5.
102. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 169.
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resolution of the antitrust counterclaim.' 0 3
1. Application of the Case Law to the Dispute
The court of appeals focused its analysis on three areas:
1) Whether prohibiting the arbitration of international anti-
trust claims is compatible with the Convention; 10 4 2) Whether
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.10 5 precludes the application of the
American Safety doctrine 0 6 to Mitsubishi;0 7 and 3) Whether all
arbitration should be stayed pending a judicial decision be-
cause SCP's antitrust counterclaim must be decided by a
court.10 8 The court stated that the nonarbitrability of antitrust
issues in domestic contract claims is a well-founded and estab-
lished doctrine. 09 It concluded that antitrust laws express a
policy important enough to overcome the mandate of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act and the Convention that predispute agree-
ments to arbitrate are valid and binding." 0
The First Circuit declined to analogize international anti-
trust claims to international securities claims."' Instead, the
court of appeals relied on the American Safety doctrine, which
excepts domestic antitrust claims from arbitration," 2 and de-
cided that antitrust claims are not arbitrable in an international
context." 13
2. Application of the Convention to the Dispute
The court of appeals directed its attention to article II of
the Convention, which concerns the recognition of an arbitra-
103. Id.
104. Id. at 163-66; see supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
105. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
106. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
107. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 166-68.
108. Id. at 169.
109. Id. at 163.
110. Id. at 169.
111. Id. at 168. The court did not feel Scherk, 417 U.S. 506 (1974), mandated
the conclusion that international antitrust claims are arbitrable. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d
at 166-68. The court held that a "Scherk-type balancing... can have only one result:
to enforce the private arbitration clause at the expense of public policy would be
,unreasonable.' " Id. at 168.
112. American Safety, 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968); see supra text accompanying
notes 48-59.
113. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 169.
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tion agreement," 4 and held that, due to the great public inter-
est in fostering competition, antitrust claims are not capable of
settlement by arbitration." 15 The extent to which the Court re-
lied on the Convention is unclear because article II contains no
specific public policy exception to the enforcement of agree-
ments to arbitrate." 6 Article II provides for the enforcement
of arbitration agreements by referring the parties to arbitration
whenever a claim arises and they have agreed to arbitrate.' i
The only limitations on enforceability concern subject matter
not capable of settlement by arbitration, as provided by article
ii(1),118 or those agreements that are "null and void, inopera-
tive or incapable of being performed," as provided by article
II(3).' t9
D. Comparison of Approaches Used by the District Court and the
Court of Appeals
The district court and the court of appeals both agreed
that SCP's antitrust counterclaim was within the scope of the
parties' arbitration agreement. 2 0 The district court recognized
that "[a]s a general rule, claims under the antitrust laws are 'of
a character inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration' "121
but also reasoned that the American Safety doctrine does not
govern antitrust claims arising from international transac-
tions.' 22  The district court concluded that the decision in
Scherk should be analogized to international antitrust claims.123
The court of appeals, on the other hand, ruled that be-
114. Convention, supra note 4, art. II; see supra note 98 (for the text of article II).
115. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 166.
116. See supra note 98.
117. Convention, supra note 4, art. II.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Petition, supra note 69, at 5. The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's holding that each of the claims and counterclaims which had been referred to
arbitration, including SCP's Sherman Act counterclaim, was within the scope of the
arbitration agreement of the parties, but that the arbitration clause was "not unlim-
ited in scope." Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 159; see supra notes 93-104 and accompanying
text.
121. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., No. 82-538, at 9
(D.P.R. Nov. 24, 1982) (order compelling arbitration) (quoting Amenican Safety, 391
F.2d at 825-27).
122. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., No. 82-538, at
10 (D.P.R. Nov. 24, 1982) (order compelling arbitration).
123. Id.
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cause of the differing purposes of the securities and antitrust
laws, an analogy to Scherk does not mandate the conclusion
that SCP's antitrust counterclaim is arbitrable. 24 The Federal
Arbitration Act does not mandate arbitration of antitrust
claims arising in domestic disputes because arbitration of such
disputes could pose unacceptable dangers to private enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws.' 25 The court found that the same
reasoning precludes arbitration of antitrust claims arising in
international disputes, at least when the international agree-
ment involves the sale and distribution of products in the
United States. 126
The court of appeals weighed the policy considerations re-
garding the arbitration of a private party's international con-
tract disputes against the public's interest in the preservation
of economic order in the United States.2 7 This balancing test
was also applied in Scherk where the Court weighed the policy
considerations of giving the securities investors the full protec-
tion of the securities laws against the policy considerations of
giving the investor the certainty of an arbitration clause.' 28
The Scherk court decided that the individual investor would
best be served by enforcement of the arbitration clause. 29
The court of appeals in Mitsubishi, on the other hand, com-
pared the policy considerations underlying the securities laws
and the antitrust laws and concluded that the protection pro-
vided by the securities laws benefits only a small segment of
society.' 3 0 The court of appeals reasoned that the antitrust
laws have an industry-wide effect in that they regulate an entire
industry or a group of related industries to ensure competition
and thereby protect the general public from high prices.'13
The court concluded that to enforce the private arbitration
clause at the expense of public policy would be unrea-
124. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 167-68.
125. Id. at 163; see American Safety, 361 F.2d at 826.
126. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 163, 167.
127. d. at 168.
128. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516-18 (1974).
129. Id.
130. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 168. The court of appeals concluded that the securi-
ties laws "are designed primarily to protect a fairly small 'special interest' group:
those investors in a particular security who read and are influenced by information in
the company's prospectuses or financial reports." d.
131. Id.; see American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826-27.
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sonable.13 2
There are two possible approaches in deciding Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. The Supreme Court
could affirm the court of appeals decision and extend the Amer-
ican Safety doctrine to an international commercial dispute,
thereby concluding that because domestic antitrust claims may
not be arbitrated, international antitrust claims are also nonar-
bitrable. Conversely, the Court could apply the reasoning of
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. to permit arbitration of antitrust
claims in an international context.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims
It has been suggested that private antitrust actions vindi-
cate important public interests by helping to preserve a com-
petitive economy and that therefore, arbitration of private anti-
trust claims ill-serves the public welfare.1 3 3 However, lower
courts have recognized that antitrust claims arising in contrac-
tual disputes are often frivolous. 1 4  Antitrust claims may be
raised in an attempt to remove the dispute to a forum per-
ceived by the antitrust claimant to be more favorable. 35 Often
132. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 168. But cf. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10 (upholding the
enforceability of a forum selection clause requiring that disputes arising out of inter-
national transactions be brought before a special English court).
The notion of unreasonableness referred to by the court of appeals in Mitsubishi
is, in part, based on the fact that successful antitrust plaintiffs are awarded treble
damages in a court action, 15 U.S.C. § 15; see Pitofsky, Arbitration and Antitrust Enforce-
ment, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1072, 1073 (1969), but the general attitude toward award of
punitive damages in arbitration is that the punitive damage remedy is reserved to the
judiciary for reasons of public policy. See AM. ARB. Assoc., REMEDIES IN ARBITRA-
TION, 8 LAw ARB. LETTER 1, 3-4 (1984). However, a number of recent cases have
upheld punitive damages as within the authority of the arbitrator under the broad
arbitration clause. Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co., Inc. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598
F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984); Willis v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 569 F.
Supp. 821 (M.D.N.C. 1983); Baker v. Sadick, - Cal. App. 3d -, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676
(1984).
133. American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826-27.
134. See, e.g., Reisner v. General Motors Corp., 511 F. Supp. 1167, 1178 n.25
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), ajfd, 671 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982)
("[n]umerous cases are filed in the federal district courts attempting to make anti-
trust claims out of what are, at most, contract claims or fraud claims involving con-
duct between two parties. . . . Such claims are regularly dismissed, however, after
taking up considerable amounts ofjudicial time.").
135. See Perlman & Nelson, supra note 3, at 217-19. These commentators sug-
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such claims are used to turn a simple contract dispute into a
claim entitled to treble damages and attorney's fees, 13 6 or as a
means to delay or increase the costs to the opposing party pur-
suing a bona fide contract action.1 37
A concern of courts that further supports their decisions
holding antitrust claims nonarbitrable is the possibility that
contracts of adhesion between a monopolist and its customers
will determine the forum for trying antitrust violations. 38
This reasoning presumes that the defendant has violated the
Sherman Act.' 39 This may not always be true because many
antitrust claims are found to be frivolous.' 40
The American Safety court also based its decision on the no-
tion that antitrust cases are likely to be complex and time con-
suming, and are therefore more amenable to judicial rather
than to arbitration procedures.' 4 ' However, attorneys, scien-
tists, and business people are frequently appointed to serve as
arbitrators."4 2 Consequently, the assertion of judicial superi-
ority is merely a reassertion of the common law's hostility to-
ward arbitration that Congress sought to eliminate by enacting
the Federal Arbitration Act.'14
The court of appeals in Mitsubishi has extended the Ameri-
can Safety doctrine from a purely domestic context to an inter-
national context."' This rationale is at odds with both the
gest that differences in substantive law, public policies, and procedures may en-
courage some perceived material advantage. They conclude that as a result, interna-
tional commercial arbitration provides a useful means of minimizing the opportunity
for certain kinds of procedural maneuvering that are often found in international
judicial procedures. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976) (providing federal courts with
original jurisdiction over federal antitrust actions).
136. See Note, Antitrust Enforcement By Private Parties: Analysis of Developments in the
Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE LJ. 1010, 1062 (1952).
137. See id.
138. American Safety, 391 F.2d at 827.
139. See id.
140. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
141. American Safety, 391 F.2d at 827.
142. See Meyerowitz, supra note 6, at 79-80; see also American Safety, 391 F.2d at
827 ("commercial arbitrators are frequently men drawn for their business expertise
143. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982); see Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852, 858
(1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974); Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
144. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 162, 165, 167-68.
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Convention and the Arbitration Act. The comparison of a do-
mestic antitrust claim with an international antitrust claim fails
to address the policy considerations underlying both the Con-
gressional mandate in favor of arbitrating international dis-
putes t4 5 and the Supreme Court's decision in Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co.
14 6
In Mitsubishi, the court of appeals also reasoned that anti-
trust claims are nonarbitrable due to the great public interest
in their judicial resolution.' 47 However, the court did note that
in the views of other circuit courts a post-dispute agreement to
arbitrate an antitrust claim may be valid and binding.' 48 This
acknowledgment appears to negate the court of appeals ration-
ale in Mitsubishi regarding the great public policy in a judicial
resolution of antitrust claims. Since arbitration proceedings
are private, 49 if antitrust claims may be arbitrated by a post-
dispute agreement, the public interest would not be served. 5 °
Furthermore, the American Safety court was concerned with the
145. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1982). The Act mandates that
-[a] written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall
be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." Id. § 2.
146. 417 U.S. 506 (1974). In Bremen, 407 U.S. 1 (1971), the Supreme Court held
that a choice-of-forum clause in an arm's length, freely negotiated international com-
mercial contract should be recognized and enforced, absent a compelling showing
that it should be set aside. Id. at 15. For a discussion of choice-of-laws rules prob-
lems, see generally Collins, Arbitration Clauses and Forum Selecting Clauses in the Conflict of
Laws: Some Recent Developments in England, 2J. MAR. L. & CoM. 363 (1971); Sassoon,
Choice of Tribunal and the Proper Law of the Contract, 1964 J. Bus. L. 18 (1964). The
Supreme Court disregarded the notion that the United States courts should not be
ousted ofjurisdiction by parties to a commercial contract and stated that "[w]e can-
not have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively
on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts." Bremen, 407 U.S. at
9.
147. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 168.
148. See id. at 168 n. 12; Nissen, Antitrust and Arbitration in International Commerce,
17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 110, 119 (1976) ("an arbitration agreement entered into after an
antitrust claim arises is enforceable.").
149. COM. ARB. R. 25 (1984); Coulson, Survey of International Arbitration Proce-
dures, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION KIT: A COMPILATION OF BASIC AND FREQUENTLY
REQUESTED DOCUMENTS 169, 183 (ed. Brown 1982); Holtzman, The Importance of
Choosing the Right Place to Arbitrate an International Case, in PRIVATE INVESTORS
ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 183, 184 (ed. V.
Cameron 1977).
150. Loevinger, supra note 6, at 1091 ("[a]ntitrust claims . . . involve the public
interest. The enforcement of important public policies is the basic business of the
courts which should not be abdicated to other agencies or processes.").
216 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 8:194
possibility of a contract of adhesion containing an arbitration
clause rather than the public interest in judicial resolution of
antitrust claims. 5 ' There is, therefore, no per se rule against
the arbitrability of antitrust claims, but rather, a United States
doctrine that domestic antitrust claims should not be arbi-
trated. The rationale of American Safety has little or no force in
an international context.
5 2
B. Arbitrability of Securities Claims
The rationale of Scherk providing for the arbitration of in-
ternational securities claims should, by analogy, apply to Mit-
subishi. International antitrust claims require the same treat-
ment as international securities claims.' 53 Although Scherk in-
volved a securities issue, the court's reasoning compels the
same result in an international dispute concerning statutes
designed primarily to protect the public interest rather than to
regulate relationships between commercial partners."'
The court of appeals attempts to distinguish Mitsubishi
from Scherk by suggesting that because the antitrust laws affect
far more people than the securities laws, the public interest in
the judicial enforcement of the antitrust laws is far greater than
that of the securities regulations.' 55 The validity of this rea-
soning is highly questionable. The purpose of the securities
laws is to preserve the fair and efficient functioning of the na-
tion's securities markets, which is of considerable importance
to the overall health of the economy. 56 Billions of dollars are
invested in the securities markets 57 by United States citizens
151. American Safety, 391 F.2d at 827; see Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453
F.2d 1209, 1213, 1215 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972). The Coenen court
held that agreements to arbitrate antitrust issues made after the dispute has arisen
are enforceable. 453 F.2d at 1215. The rationale was based on the fact the parties
are free to settle their antitrust disputes without court intervention. Id.; accord Cobb
v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1974).
152. See, e.g., Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 436-37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432
U.S. 910 (1977); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 10, 27 n.59 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
afd, 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
153. See infra text accompanying notes 155-63.
154. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 6, at 1199-1200.
155. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 168.
156. See S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186
(1963).
157. Fedders, supra note 32, at 2.
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as well as foreigners. 5 ' The securities laws are important
guarantors of the free flow of accurate and adequate informa-
tion in the financial markets and are essential to its proper
functioning. ' 59
Furthermore, the court of appeals' reliance on the public
interest notion is inappropriate in that Congress has not
sought to guarantee that the public interest is represented by
or even a concern in the enforcement of antitrust cases by pri-
vate plaintiffs. 6 ' To illustrate: A private antitrust plaintiff may
settle his lawsuit pursuant to a settlement agreement without
the approval of either the court or other governmental agency,
and regardless of whether the settlement agreement advances
or subverts the public interest.' 6 ' While Congress requires an
analysis of the competitive effect of the settlement and ap-
proval by the courts as a condition to the entry of consent set-
tlements in government antitrust actions, it does not do so in
private antitrust cases.' 62 The court of appeals' distinction in
Mitsubishi between the relative importance of the securities
laws and the antitrust laws is unpersuasive. The line of reason-
ing in support of the arbitrability of securities claims on an in-
ternational level can, by analogy, be applied to support the
arbitrability of antitrust claims on an international level.' 63
C. Application of the Convention to the Dispute
When a court is presented with a request to refer a dispute
to arbitration four preliminary questions must be resolved
158. See id. Between 1978 and 1982, purchases of stock in the United States by
foreign persons and institutions increased from U.S.$20.1 billion to U.S. $41.8 bil-
lion. Id.
159. See Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. S.E.C., 100 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1939); S.
REP. No. 47, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
160. See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
161. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4 1(a)(l); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (requiring court ap-
proval for the settlement of class actions).
162. See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-16(h)
(1976); see also Aksen, supra note 6, at 1106-07 (1969) (the parties' voluntary aban-
donment of a pending antitrust litigation would be impermissible if Congress in-
tended private antitrust claims to be exclusively resolved by courts).
163. To assume that antitrust claims are arbitrable on an international level
does not presuppose an automatic enforcement of an arbitral award rendered in such
a proceeding. On the contrary, the Convention provides that the recognition and
enforcement of an arbitral award may be denied by a signatory state if the recogni-
tion and enforcement is contrary to that state's public policy. See Convention, supra
note 4, arts. II, V.
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before the agreement is deemed to fall within the Convention:
1) Whether there is a written agreement to arbitrate the sub-
ject matter of the dispute; 6 4 2) Whether the agreement pro-
vides for arbitration in a territory of a signatory state;'6 5
3) Whether the agreement arises out of a commercial relation-
ship; 166 and 4) Whether the commercial relationship has some
reasonable relationship with a foreign state.' 6 7 In Mitsubishi,
all of these conditions are met. 168 The remaining issues to be
dealt with concern the application of articles II and V to the
parties' dispute.
1. Article II
Article II, which refers to the recognition and enforcement
of an arbitral agreement has two requirements. The agree-
ment must involve a "subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration '  and it must not be "null and void, inoperative
or incapable of being performed."17 0 If these prerequisites are
satisfied, the Convention unambiguously provides that an
agreement shall be recognized by the signatory states and that
parties to the agreement shall be referred to arbitration. 171
164. Id. art. II; see supra note 98 (for text of article II).
165. Convention, supra note 4, art. I. This article provides, in pertinent part:
1. This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where
the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out
of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply
to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where
their recognition and enforcement are sought.
3. When signing, ratifying or acceeding to this Convention, or notify-
ing extension under article X hereof, any State may on the basis of reciproc-
ity declare that it will apply the Convention ...only to differences arising
out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered
as commercial under the national law of the State making such declaration.
Id.
166. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982).
167. Id.; Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1982).
168. Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at 157.
169. Convention, supra note 4, art. II; see supra note 98 (for the text of article II).
170. Convention, supra note 4, art. II. The grounds upon which an agreement
can be found null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed are fraud,
mistake, duress and waiver. See Ledee, 684 F.2d at 187; infra note 179 and accompany-
ing text.
171. Convention, supra note 4, art. II. In McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT
S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032 (3rd Cir. 1974), the Court stated:
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A United States court must first decide whether the matter
is capable of settlement by arbitration.7 2 The court has three
options: 1) The court can refer to the federal law on the sub-
ject;1713 2) The court can apply the choice-of-laws rules' 74 to
determine what law is applicable and then determine the arbi-
trability by reference to that law; or 3) The court can apply the
law that would govern under article V of the Convention where
recognition and enforcement of the award is at issue. 175 This
last course of action may be the most appropriate 76 in that by
allowing the court to deny recognition of an arbitration award
if its subject matter is incapable of settlement by arbitration
under federal law, article V(2) (b) effectively accommodates the
first option.1 77 Article V(1)(a) permits the parties' choice of
applicable law to be taken into account. 78
There is nothing discretionary about article 11(3) of the Convention. It
states that district courts shall at the request of a party to an arbitration
agreement refer the parties to arbitration. The enactment of Pub. L. 91-
368, providing a federal remedy for the enforcement of the Convention,
including removal jurisdiction without regard to diversity or amount in con-
troversy, demonstrates the firm commitment of the Congress to the elimina-
tion of vestiges of judicial reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements, at
least in the international commercial context.
Id. at 1037; see also I.T.A.D. Associates, Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir.
1981) ("[o]ur interpretation of the Article 11(3) proviso must not only observe the
strong policy favoring arbitration, but must also foster the adoption of standards
which can be uniformly applied on an international scale.").
172. See Convention, supra note 4, art. V; infra note 175.
173. See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1982); United States Arbi-
tration Act, ch. 213, § 1, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).
174. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 117 (1971). Section
117 explains that "a valid judgment rendered in one State . . . will be recognized
and enforced in a sister State even though the strong public policy of the latter State
would have precluded recovery in its courts on the original claim." Id.
175. Convention, supra note 4. Article V provides in pertinent part:
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be re-
fused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and en-
forcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbi-
tration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to
the public policy of that country.
Id. (emphasis added); see S. EXEC. Doc. No. E., supra note 5, at 4, 8; ABA Report, supra
note 5, at 254-55.
176. McMahon, supra note 5, at 757.
177. Id.
178. Convention, supra note 4, art. V. The Agreement provided for Swiss law to
apply as if the contract had been entirely performed therein, and for the application
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The "null and void" clause of the Convention has been
scrutinized by the United States.' 79 Although the exact mean-
ing of article 11(3) is unclear, there are two possible interpreta-
tions.'8 0 Under the first interpretation, article 11(3) provides
few grounds for disregarding an arbitral agreement 1" because
article V lists various grounds on which a court may ignore ar-
bitration.' 8 2  Thus, a party may have to proceed through an
arbitration before it is able to challenge the award and the un-
derlying agreement. 83 Article II is, in effect, being properly
construed to apply only to agreements to arbitrate and not to
arbitral awards. The second interpretation suggests that the
public policy defenses of article V, allowing a court to deny
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, are applicable
to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral agreements by vir-
tue of article II(3). ts4 This clause states that a court need not
enforce an arbitral agreement if it finds the agreement "null and
of Japanese Commercial Arbitration Rules. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying
text.
179. In Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1982), the First Cir-
cuit was confronted with the issue of the relationship between the Federal Arbitration
Act and a Puerto Rican statute that prohibits arbitration outside the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico. Id. at 186. The appellants, distributors of ceramic tiles who alleged
that the manufacturer had wrongfully terminated their distributorship, argued that
under a Puerto Rican statute, P.R. LAws ANN. tit. X, § 3372 (1976), contracting par-
ties may not agree to clauses or conditions in contravention of law, morals, or public
order. Ledee, 684 F.2d at 186. The court of appeals ordered arbitration and dis-
missed the complaint, basing their decision on the fact that the agreement fell within
the Convention. Id. at 187. Further, the court said that the "null and void" clause of
the Convention encompasses only those situations such as fraud, mistake, duress and
waiver that can be applied neutrally on an international scale. Id. As a result, the
"null and void" clause of the Convention did not incorporate the Puerto Rico
Dealer's Act, P.R. LAws ANN. tit. X, § 258 (1976) which prohibits certain disputes
from being arbitrated outside of Puerto Rico. Ledee, 684 F.2d at 185; see I.T.A.D.
Assoc., Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1981); McCreary Tire & Rubber
Co. v. CEAT S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032, 1037 (3d Cir. 1974). The notion that an arbitra-
tion agreement "shall" be recognized by the signatories and that parties to an agree-
ment "shall" be referred to arbitration has been interpreted by other signatory coun-
tries. See, e.g., Paczy v. Haendler & Natermann GmbH, I LLOYD'S L.R. 302 (C.A.
1981), reported in 9 Y.B. Com. ARB. 445 (1984) (United Kingdom); Louis Dreyfus
Corp. of New York v. Oriana Soc. di Navigazione S.p.A., Foro It. 1 1051 (Corte cass.
1970), reported in 1 Y.B. Com. ARB. 189 (1976) (Italy).
180. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 6, at 1213.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Compare Convention, supra note 4, art. II with id. art. V. (emphasis added).
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void, inoperative or incapable of being performed."' 8 5 If the
arbitration agreement presupposes the enforcement of an
eventual arbitral award, the agreement cannot be fully per-
formed if the final award will not be enforced. A final award
need not be enforced due to the public policy defense of article
V.' 86 This interpretation also relies on the notion that the
court would consider many of the article V defenses, notwith-
standing the fact that article V refers solely to the recognition
and enforcement of arbitral awards, when deciding whether to
retain jurisdiction over the dispute. 8 7 Under this interpreta-
tion, article II is, in effect, being loosely construed. The public
policy defenses in article V which refer to the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards, conspicuously absent from ar-
ticle II, are being improperly imposed on article II.
In its strictest reading, article II of the Convention clearly
calls for all agreements to arbitrate between signatory states to
be recognized and enforced. 88 Since the Supreme Court has
held that the interpretation of a treaty begins with the lan-
guage of the treaty itself, 89 the Court should look first to the
language of the Convention and its implementing legislation.
The question is not whether agreements to arbitrate should be
enforced; it is whether the resulting award should be recog-
nized and enforced.
2. Article V
Article V of the Convention refers to the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards. 90 According to article V, an
award may not be recognized or enforced by a signatory state
if it would be contrary to the public policy of that state.' 9'
Theoretically, there could be a duty to refer a matter to arbi-
185. Id. art. II; see Scherk, 417 U.S. at 530-31 n. 10 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
186. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 6, at 1214.
187. See 2 E. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAw, para. 9.139 (2d rev. ed. 1971);
Ehrenhaft, supra note 6, at 1214.
188. Convention, supra note 4, art. II.
189. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982).
"The clear import of treaty language controls unless 'application of the words of the
treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent
or expectations of its signatories.' " Id. (quoting Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S.
49, 54 (1963)).
190. Convention, supra note 4, art. V.
191. Id.
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tration under article II even though it may be so offensive to a
nation's public policy that it could not later be enforced under
article V. Arguments contravening public policy would have to
be made at this later stage in challenges to arbitral awards.'
92
Article V(2) (a) of the Convention permits a signatory state
to deny recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award if the
"subject matter. . . is not capable of settlement by arbitration
under the law of that country."'' 93 This provision is trouble-
some' 94 because a number of signatory states to the Conven-
tion have antitrust or other restrictive business practice laws
and the type of conduct these laws prohibit, and the attendant
public policy concerns, can vary substantially from state to
state.' 95 The public policy exception to the enforcement of
awards contained in article V(2)(b) has been referred to as a
loophole in the Convention. 96  Hence, a party seeking to
avoid recognition or enforcement of an award under the Con-
192. Newman & Burrows, supra note 6, at 22, col. 2.
193. Convention, supra note 4, art. V.
194. Aksen, supra note 5, at 8. Although personally hoping that the arbitrability
of a claim would be decided by the arbitrator, this commentator concluded that arti-
cle V(2)(b) of the Convention "makes such a desirable result unlikely." Id. at 9.
Consequently, the application of domestic standards of arbitrability "poses unduly
complicated legal questions," id. at 13, because the public policy language of article
V(2)(b) would be utilized to refuse enforcement of an award involving, for example, a
question of antitrust law. Id.; see McMahon, supra note 5, at 753 n.83. Article V(2)(a)
would "permit the court to refuse to recognize the agreement if its subject matter is
incapable of settlement by arbitration under federal law." Id. at 757. "These provi-
sions permit the court, where enforcement . . . is sought, to apply the laws of the
forum, presumably including its conflict rules, to determine arbitrability." Barry,
supra note 14, at 835 n.14. "The Convention's failure to state what law governs the
determination of whether the dispute is 'capable of settlement by arbitration' and
whether the agreement is 'null and void, inoperative or incapable of being per-
formed' is a significant inadequacy in a document dealing with international commer-
cial transactions." McMahon, supra note 5, at 753 n.83; see also G. GAJA, INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION part I, at I.B.2:
The similarity in the tests of Article II(I) and Article V(2)(a) and the fact that
Article II was introduced in the Convention only at the late stage of the
drafting indicate that also according to Article II the arbitrability of the dis-
pute must be tested under the lexfori-the law of the State where effects of
the arbitration agreements are sought.
Id. (footnote omitted).
195. See 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS
ABROAD § 4.02 (2d ed. 1981).
196. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 6, at 1214; Kitagawa, Contractual Autonomy in Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration Including a Japanese Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL LIBER
AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 133, 139 (P. Sanders ed. 1967).
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vention may assert that the facts of his particular case invoke
the application of the public policy exception, thereby avoiding
enforcement of an award and perhaps even arbitration.1 97
The original interpretation of the public policy defense
was very broad.' 9s Although its definition has undergone vari-
ous changes, always with an eye toward limiting its applica-
tion, t 99 it still appears to serve as a catchall provision permit-
ting varied applications of the public policy defense. 00 The
public policy defense has been referred to as a catchall because
it encompasses those arbitration situations where the "basic
notions of morality and justice have not yet been specifically
delineated."' 20 t However, a conflict with a domestic law is not
a per se violation of public policy.2 0 2 The success of a public
197. See Barry, supra note 14, at 843.
198. See infra notes 199-202.
199. The first important multilateral definition of the public policy defense is
found in the formal rules governing international commercial arbitration set forth in
the 1927 Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for
signature Sept. 24, 1923, 92 L.N.T.S. 301 [hereinafter cited as Geneva Convention].
The post-World War II bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
give only a rather ambiguous statement that arbitral awards will be enforced between
two states "except where found to be contrary to public policy." See, e.g., Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, July 14, 1956, United States-Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation, Oct. 1, 1954, United States-Greece, 5 U.S.T. 1829, T.I.A.S. No.
3057; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 30, 1953, United States-
Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. The Geneva Convention, supra, states that
arbitral awards will be enforced only if "not contrary to the public policy or to the
principles of the law of the country in which it is sought to be relied upon." Id. art.
I(e). This definition was adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Economic and
Social Council of the United Nations in 1955. Committee on the Enforcement of
International Arbitral Awards, U.N. Doc. No. E/AC.42/SR. 12/7, at 3-10 (1955). For
a discussion of the New York Conference, see generally G. HAIGHT, CONVENTION ON
THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS (1958). This
definition was later modified for the final draft of the Convention. 2 P. SANDERS,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 293, 323 (1960); Contini, International
CommercialArbitration, 8 AM.J. COMP. L. 283, 304 (1959); see also Quigley, supra note 5,
at 1070-71 (phrase "or with fundamental principles of the law (ordre public)" was
not added to article V because it may be read as broadening the definition of public
policy); Comment, United Nations Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention: United States Acces-
sion, 2 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 67, 81 (1971) (possibility remains open that the public pol-
icy clause of article V may be used discriminately).
200. See Aksen, supra note 5, at 13; Quigley, supra note 5, at 1071 n.93; Com-
ment, supra note 14, at 229.
201. Comment, supra note 14, at 245.
202. See Bitronik Mess-und Therapiegerate v. Medford Medical Instrument Co.,
415 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1976). Although the court did consider whether the public
policy defense attempted to apply domestic arbitration law to foreign arbitration
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policy defense to the recognition and enforcement of an arbi-
tral award, where its enforcement is in conflict with a domestic
statute, appears uncertain.
In effect, it is unclear whether an arbitral award rendered
in an antitrust action will be recognized and/or enforced in the
United States. However, from the language of articles II and V
it is clear that under the Convention parties should be referred
to arbitration in all cases; 20 3 arguments in contravention of
public policy are to be raised after the award has been ren-
dered. 20 4 In light of the fact that parties may have a post-dis-
pute agreement to arbitrate an antitrust claim 20 5 and the re-
sulting award will be enforced, the public policy exception to
arbitration of antitrust claims is weak.20 6 There may be other
bases for denying recognition of an arbitral award and they
may well be valid in that article V(2)(b) acts as a safety valve
allowing consideration of the national policies of the Conven-
tion's signatories. These defenses should not, however, be ap-
plied to article II, referring to the recognition and enforcement
of an arbitral agreement.20 7 To interpret the Convention in
any other manner would deny the consistency in international
trade relations that its makers sought to create and would
demonstrate a readiness on the part of the United States to
abandon its treaty commitments whenever they are found con-
trary to some perceived public interest.
CONCLUSION
Article II of the Convention unambiguously mandates that
all agreements to arbitrate shall be recognized and enforced by
its signatory states. This article should be the sole determinant
awards by equating a specific statute with a public policy, it is clear that the court
believed a statutory violation would be insufficient to invoke the public policy de-
fense without considering basic notions of morality andjustice. Comment, supra note
14, at 240-4 1. This reinforces the principle set down in Scherk, 417 U.S. 506 (1974),
that the emphasis given to a statute because it is domestic will not automatically sup-
port nonrecognition of a foreign arbitral award. Id. at 513-14.
203. See Convention, supra note 4, arts. II, V; supra notes 169-97 and accompany-
ing text.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 190-92.
205. American Safety, 391 F.2d at 827; Coenen, 453 F.2d at 1213; see supra note 151
and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 156-61 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 189-200 and accompanying text.
FOREIGN ARBITRAL A WARDS
of whether arbitration agreements should be enforced, regard-
less of the issue at stake. Article V of the Convention provides
for the denial of the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral
award if its enforcement would be contrary to the public policy
of the country where its enforcement is sought. The public
policy exception to the enforcement of arbitral awards does
not apply to the enforcement of arbitral agreements. The
mandate of the Convention, coupled with the holding in Scherk,
supports the conclusion that international antitrust disputes
are arbitrable. International commercial arbitration is an in-
dispensable dispute resolution mechanism. The Convention
provides an internationally neutral means of resolving transna-
tional disputes and will be most effective if the courts of its
signatory states interpret its provisions consistently, apply
them broadly, and construe its defenses narrowly. Interna-
tional commercial trade and transactions can only be enhanced
if parties to an arbitral agreement can be assured that their
agreement will be upheld and their disputes resolved as antici-
pated and mandated by the Convention.
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